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I. INTRODUCTION: CONFUSION OF CRIMINALITY WITH JURISDICTION

It is important not to confuse criminality with jurisdiction.'

The term

criminality is usually associated with the legislative authority to proscribe

conduct. The term jurisdiction is usually associated with the judicial
authority to subject a person or thing to the processes of a court.2 The
*
The author is a graduate of St. Peter's College, School of Management Studies,
Oxford University (M.B.A.) and of the University of California, Hastings College of Law (J.D.).
He has been a member of the American Society of International Law since 1992.
1.
Theodor Meron, InternationalCrminalizationof Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 554, 561 (1995). Unless otherwise noted, I use the word jurisdiction to refer to adjudicatory
jurisdiction. See infra note 98.
2.
The confusion of criminality with jurisdiction is more common than one would
suppose. The most recent example in which this confusion surfaces is the argument that because
murder, rape, and other war crimes are also crimes under national law, defendants must have
known of the illegality of their alleged actions and thus, an international Tribunal may try
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legislative authority to proscribe certain acts by law is not necessarily
coupled with the judicial authority to try to punish violators of the law.

The question of the criminality of the atrocities that occurred in the former
Yugoslavia is distinguishable from the question of which courts have
jurisdiction to try those accused of these offenses.3 The recent creation of
the International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former
Yugoslavia (Tribunal) raises both these questions.
To date, most scholarly debate has focused on the former question,
i.e. which international laws govern the atrocities committed in the former
Yugoslavia. The latter question has received far less comment. 4 The

question of which courts have jurisdiction to try those accused of violations
of international humanitarian law is the topic of this paper.
Part II
addresses the legitimacy of the creation of the Tribunal. Part III discusses
the legal limits of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Part IV examines the

Tribunal's ability to question its own jurisdiction.
conclusions from the reasoning of the prior sections.

Part V draws some

II. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CREATION OF THE TRIBUNAL
A.

Composition of the Tribunal

International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former
Yugoslavia consists of three main organs: the Prosecutor, the Chambers

defendants on this basis. See IT. Doc. IT-94-1-AR72, Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dugko Tadid
(Appeals Chamber), para. 135 (Sep. 8, 1995) [hereinafter Appeals Chamber].
Presumably, these scholars are addressing the argument of nullum crimen sine lege,
nulla poena sine lege (no crime without law, no punishment without law). Indeed, international
law prohibits prosecution for crimes, which were not yet law at the time of their commission.
However, these scholars are confusing the defendant's knowledge of the criminality of his actions
with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for
Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639,
647 (1993).
Knowledge of the criminality of one's actions does not confer jurisdiction to all
tribunals in which such actions are deemed illegal. Jurisdiction requires some greater connection
between the illicit action and the tribunal sitting in judgment of the accused. For example,
assuming the auto theft laws of Germany closely resemble those of California, a German court
would not have jurisdiction to try a person accused of stealing an automobile in California,
without some greater connection between the theft or the automobile and Germany.
3.
Theodor Meron, InternationalCriminalizationof Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 554, 561 (1995).
4.
George H. Aldrich, Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 64-5 (1996) (reprinting without commentary the decision
of the Tribunal).
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and the Registry. 5 A major distinction between the current Tribunal and
previous war crimes tribunals is the lack of Office of Defense as an organ
of the Tribunal. 6 Although the Statute of the Tribunal contains a provision
for the appointment of defense counsel,7 the Statute does not create an
institutional mechanism to provide for the appointment or support of the
defense counsel.
The Special Task Force of the ABA Section of
International Law and Practice criticized this failing. 8
The role of the Prosecutor is to fulfill the purpose of the Tribunal: the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed since 1991 in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia. 9 The Prosecutor is responsible for the gathering of evidence,
the investigation into criminal cases and the preparation of indictments.' °
The Prosecutor bears the burden of proof in all proceedings."
The
Prosecutor must act independently and may not seek nor receive
12
instructions from any government or from any other source.
Eleven judges comprise the Court.' 3 No two judges may be nationals
from the same state. Each judge serves a term of four years and may be

5.
Statute of the Tribunal, arts. 11(a)-il(c) reprinted in United Nations: SecretaryGeneral's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1190 (1993) [hereinafter Statute of the
Tribunal]. There is also a bureau, which handles administrative matters.
6.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO

ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMMITTED INTHE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 20 (1993) (noting that "all

defendants before the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal were entitled both to appointed defense
counsel provided without charge and to hired defense counsel of their own choosing").
7.
Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 21(4)(d).
8.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at 19-21.
9.
Statute of the Tribunal, art. 16(1); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/ Rev. 5
(June 15, 1995) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure and Evidence], incorporating the Statute of the
Tribunal, art. 1.
10. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at arts. 16(1), 18(1-2).
11.
Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 21(3). According to this article, the
Tribunal, through the Office of the Prosecutor, bears the burden of proof on this issue of
jurisdiction.
12. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 16(2). It is unclear how this article
would operate if under the forthcoming Paris peace conference, certain indicted defendants were
to receive immunity from prosecution.
13. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 26. The following lists the judges of the
Tribunal and their nationalities.
The Appeals Chamber consists of: Antonio Cassese, (Italy) (Presiding Judge); Sir
Ninian Stephen, (Australia); Li Hao Pei, (China); Jules Deschenes, (Canada); George Abi-Saab,
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eligible for re-election.' 4 The judges are responsible for adopting rules of
procedure and evidence for the Tribunal.' 5 The Chambers are composed of
two Trial Chambers (with three judges each) and one Appeals Chamber
(with five judges). 16 The Trial Chambers serve as the first level courts of

the Tribunal.
The Appeals Chamber handles both interlocutory and final appeals.
Both types of appeals are limited to two grounds: an error or question of
law invalidating a decision of the Trial Chamber or an error of fact, which
has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. 17 The Appeals Chamber may hear
an interlocutory appeal of a Trial Chamber's decision on preliminary
motions only in the case of a dismissal of an objection based on lack of
All other preliminary motions are immune from
jurisdiction.' 8
interlocutory appeal.' 9 Both the accused and the Prosecutor may appeal
Levie,
final judgments of the Trial Chamber. 20 As pointed out by Howard
2'
acquittal!
an
appeal
may
Prosecutor
the
that
suggests
this language
(Egypt) resigned to resume academic activities and was replaced by Found Abdel-Moneim Riad,
(Egypt) on Oct. 3, 1995.
The first Trial Chamber consists of: Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, (U.S.A.) (Presiding
Judge); Rustam S. Sidhwa, (Pakistan); Lal Chand Vohrah, (Malaysia).
The second Trial Chamber consists of: Adolphus Godwin Karibi-Whyte, (Nigeria)
(Presiding Judge); Germain Le Foyer de Costil (France); Elizabeth Odio Benito (Costa Rica)
(Vice-President of the Tribunal). See Sec/C./Res. 857 (1993). See also Judge Antonio Cassese of
Italy Elected President of International TribwWl for Crimes in Former Yugoslavia, 12/02/1993
Federal News Service; Monday Highlights, 10/03/1993 Federal News Service.
14. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 13(4).
15. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 15.
16. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 11-12.
17. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 25(1).
18. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 72(B); Appeals Chamber, infra note 34, at
para. 6.
19. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 72(B); Appeals Chamber, infra note 34, at
para. 6.
20. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 25(1); Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Rule 108(A).
21.
Howard S. Levie, The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia: A Comparisonwith the Past and a Look at the Future, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
CoM. 1, 26 (1995). See also Michael P. Scharf, A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes
Tribunal, 25 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305 (1997)(discussing the infringement of a defendant's
rights by double jeopardy). Indeed the Prosecutor has appealed the first judgment of the
Tribunal, Prosecutor v. Tadid, IT. Doc. IT-94-1-T. The defendant was convicted on eleven
counts and acquitted on twenty counts of his indictment. Prosecutor v. Tadid, IT. Doc. IT-94-1-T,
Tadi6 Judgment (May 7, 1997); Press Release, Tadid Case: The Verdict, UN Doc. CC/PIO/190E (May 7, 1997). Tadid has been sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for his offenses.
Prosecutor v. Tadid, IT. Doc. IT-94-1-T, Sentencing Judgment (July 14, 1997). Despite this
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The Registry assists the Chambers and the Prosecutor in the

performance of their functions. 22

The Registry is responsible for the

administration and servicing of the Tribunal,2 3 including serving as the

channel of communication

for the Tribunal,

disseminating public

information, preparing the minutes of meetings and printing all Tribunal

documents. 24
The appointments of the Tribunal organs and staff were made by the
Security Council, agents of the Security Council, or by the SecretaryGeneral. The General Assembly had a very limited role in the formation of
the Tribunal and in the selection of the Tribunal's officers and staff.25 The
Secretary-General invited nomination of judges from the General
Assembly, and then advised the Security Council to establish from these

nominations a list of candidates "taking due account of the adequate
representation of the principal legal system of the world."26 Although this
conviction, the Prosecutor has appealed the Tribunal's judgment on the twenty acquittals. Press
Release, Tadi6 Case: Defense Counsel Appeals Against Sentencing Judgment of 14 July 1997,
U.N. Doc. CC/PIO/235-E (August 9, 1997); Notice of the appeal was filed two months earlier on
June 9, 1997: Press Release, Tadii Case: ProsecutorFiles Notice of Appeal Against Judgement,
U.N. Doc. CC/PIO/210-E (June 9, 1997).
22. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 33.
23. Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at art. 17(a); Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Rule 33.
24. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 23, 1993) [hereinafter Report of
the Secretary-General] reprinted in United Nations: Secretary-General'sReport on Aspects of
Establishing an International Tribunalfor the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993), para. 90 (explaining Statute of the Tribunal, art. 16).
25. The Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, was appointed by the Security Council on the
nomination by the Secretary General. The staff of the Prosecutors, the Registrar, the staff of the
Registry were appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Statute of the Tribunal,
arts. 16(4), 16(5), 17(3), and 17(4).
26. Report of the Secretary-General, para. 75; Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 5, at
art. 13(2)(c). On August 20, 1995, the Security Council reduced the 41 judges nominated by
United Nations members (including the Vatican and Switzerland) to 23 candidates for the 11
tribunal judgeships. The list of judicial candidates consisted of: Georges Abi-Saab, (Egypt);
Julio Barberis (Argentina); Raphael Barras (Switzerland); Sikhe Camara (Guinea); Antonio
Cassese (Italy); Hans Corell (Sweden); Jules Deschenes (Canada); Alfonso de los Heros (Peru);
Jerzy Jasinski (Poland); Heike Jung (Germany); Adolphus Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria); Valentin
Kisilev (Russia); Germain Le Foyer de Costil (France); Li Hao Pei (China); Gabrielle McDonald
(United States of America); Amadou N'Diaye (Mali); Daniel Nsereko (Uganda); Elizabeth Odio
Benito (Costa Rica); Huseyin Pazarci (Turkey); Moragodage Pinto (Sri Lanka); Rustam Sidhwa
(Pakistan); Sir Ninian Stephen (Australia); and Lal Chan Vohrah (Malaysia).
23 Candidates
Named for Balkan War Crimes Tribunal, Agence France Presse (August 20, 1993).
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language seems inclusive on its face, to my knowledge
all principal legal
27
systems of the world are Western-based legal systems.

B.

Creation of the Tribunal by the Security Council ratherthan by Treaty
On May 25, 1993, the Security Council of the United Nations created

the International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former
Yugoslavia. 28 Some States and scholars recommended that the Tribunal be

created by treaty, utilizing the more representative and democratic forum of
the General Assembly, rather than by the Security Council as a subsidiary
organ. 29 The advantages of establishing the Tribunal by treaty would have

been:

(1) the participation of all United Nation member states in the

establishment of the Tribunal would endow it with greater legitimacy; (2)
signatory states to a treaty establishing the tribunal could not later dispute
the legitimacy of the establishment of the Tribunal, and (3) the participation
by such a generality of states, considering themselves legally bound to such
a treaty, would provide evidence of the consensus required to create
international customary
law, which eventually would bind even non30
signatory states.
27. Sharf, supra note 21, at 311 n.28 (commenting that only four of the eleven judges
come from countries with predominantly Muslim populations and that none of the judges are
Muslim).
28. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR., 3217th mtg. (May 25, 1993). Security Council
Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg., para. 1 (February 22, 1993) called for the imminent
establishment of the Tribunal, although it indicated neither how such a tribunal would be
established nor on what legal basis.
29. Among the States opposed to the Security Council formation of the Tribunal were:
1. China (remarks of the Chinese representative during the Security Council
deliberations on Security Council Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217, at 33 (1993)),
2. Brazil (remarks of the Brazilian representative during the Security Council
deliberations on Security Council Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217, at 36-37 (1993)),
3. Mexico (Views of the Government of Mexico Supplied Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25417 (1993)),
4. Russia (Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to
the Secretary-General (Apr. 5, 1993), U.N. Doc. S/25537, at 15 (1993), and
5. Yugoslavia (Letter from the charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of
Yugoslavia to the Secretary-General (May 19, 1993), U.N. Doc. S/25801, at 3 (1993)).
30. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines customary
international law "as a general practice accepted as law." Compare this definition to that of the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 102(2)
(1987): customary international law "results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them out of a sense of legal obligation."
These two definitions contains two elements: (1) acceptance by a generality of states,
and (2) acceptance by the generality of states out of a sense of legal obligation. See Hiram E.
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According to the Secretary General, two reasons supported the use of

the Security Council rather than the General Assembly as the proper United
Nations' organ to establish the Tribunal. First, the Secretary-General
feared that if the Tribunal were created by treaty, even after months of
negotiation and concessions, some member nations would not have voted
for its ratification.3 1 "[T]here could be no guarantee that ratifications will
be received from those States which should be parties to the treaty if it is to

be truly effective.

32

Some scholars suggested and the Secretary-General hoped that the
General Assembly would give its consent to the Tribunal by approving both
the Tribunal's budget and nominating its judges.33 Indeed, the General
Assembly endorsed the establishment of the International Tribunal: by
nominating its Judges, by approving the Tribunal's budget, and by passing
resolutions in support of the Tribunal.34 However, such consent dose not
permit States to voice their objections to: the structure of the Tribunal
(e.g., the lack of an Office of Defense), the scope of its jurisdiction, the
language of the Statute, its criminal procedure and evidence rules or the
Chodosh, Neither Treaty Nor Custom: the Emergence of Declarative InternationalLaw 26 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 87, 89 (1991).

Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), I.C.J. 4 (June 27), established
the proposition that treaties could be a source of customary international law. Accordingly, if the
General Assembly were to establish the Tribunal by treaty and a generality of states explicitly
consented to its establishment, the Tribunal would also be binding on non-signatory states as
binding customary international law. See contra J.Y. Sanders, Jurisdiction,Definition of Crimes
and Triggering Mechanisms, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 233 n. 10 (1997) (quoting GRIGORY
TUNKIN,

THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 122-33 (1974) (international law is based on

consent)).
31. Report of the Secretary General, at para. 19.
32. Report of the Secretary General, at para. 20. One wonders if the Secretary-General,
in reference to those states meant the states or parties currently disputing the land in the former
Yugoslavia or prominent and outspoken members of the United Nations (e.g., China, Russia or
the United States). See J.Y. Sanders, supra note 30, at n. 4.
See also Terry Atlas, Atrocity Docket UN Has Done Little to Prosecute Villains in
Bosnia, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 1994:
The U.S. ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, is the most forceful
advocate of the tribunal in the face of something less than unqualified
international enthusiasm. . . [T]he British and French, in particular, have been
cool toward pursuing war crime indictment of Bosnian Serb leaders that might
complicate peace talks.
33. James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations of International
HumanitarianLaw in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 643 (1993). U.N. Doc.
S/25704 at 21, 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1168. The Tribunal's Appeals Chamber also mentioned this
argument in defense of its jurisdiction.
34. Appeals Chamber, 32 I.L.M. 1993, para. 44.
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Tribunal's sanction powers.
Accordingly, the manner in which the
Tribunal was established greatly diminishes the precedential value of this
Tribunal as a representative consensus on the necessity and function of an
international criminal court.
The second reason that the Security Council was used to create the
Tribunal was the issue of time.35 The Tribunal was created in less than
seven months. The rules of criminal procedure were drafted in less than
four months. 36 Gathering the unanimous support of the General Assembly
undeniably would have taken far longer than achieving a consensus among
the limited number of States serving in the Security Council.37 The speed
of the Tribunal's creation is reflected in the imprecise drafting of its
Statute. For example, Article 1 states the Competence of the Tribunal:
"The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in
accordance with the provision of the present Statute." One scholar
explained that Article 1 should have stated that the International Tribunal
had the power "to try persons allegedly responsible for" or "accused of'
serious violations rather than to "prosecute persons responsible" for them.38
Prosecution is the function of the Prosecutor, not of the
Tribunal; and persons are) not responsible until that has
been determined by trial and conviction. Moreover, it was
obviously not intended that the serious violations of
international humanitarian law were to have been
committed in accordance with the provisions of the present
39

Statute.

Such hastily constructed phrasing does not strengthen the legitimacy
of this worthy endeavor.

35.

Secretary General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunalfor

the Prosecution of Persons Responsiblefor Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR., U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 20

(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary General's Report].
36.

William W. Home, The Real Trial of the Century, AM. LAWYER, Sept., 1995, at 5.

37.

Secretary General's Report, supra note 35.
Levie, supra note 21. at 7 n.28.
Id.

38.
39.
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C.

Was the Tribunal Established by Law?
The question of how the Tribunal was established is quite important
when read in light of one of the most important humanitarian treaties to
date, the International Convention on the Protection of Civil and Political
Rights. Article 14(1) of this treaty provides that the accused is entitled to
the right to be tried by a tribunal establishedby law. 4° Accordingly, if the
Tribunal was established by powers beyond the authority of the Security
Council (or beyond those currently belonging the United Nations), it would
be disqualified from conforming with Article 14(1).
This objection was raised by the defense counsel for Du~ko Tadi641
(Defense), the first defendant to be tried by the Tribunal. The Trial
Chamber dismissed the defense's objection to jurisdiction questioning the
validity of the Tribunal's creation rather than as questioning the Tribunal's
jurisdiction.42 The Defense then appealed to the Appeals Chamber, under
Rule 72(B), which allows interlocutory appeals in the case of dismissal of
an objection based on lack of jurisdiction.4 3 The Appeals Chamber took the
appeal. 44
The Appeals Chamber avoided the issue of whether the Tribunal was
in conformity with Article 14(1) by stating that Article 14(1) of the
International Convention on the Protection of Civil and Political Rights
applied only to national courts. "This Chamber is, however, satisfied that
the principle that a tribunal must be established by law, as explained below,
is a general principle of law imposing an international obligation which
only applies to the administration of criminal justice in a municipal
setting."45 According to the Appeals Chamber, the rights of the accused
are different under international law than under national law. Moreover, at
least in this case, the Appeals Chamber is implying that the human rights
accorded individuals are less protected under international law than under
national law!
This construction of the nature of rights is greatly troubling. The
Appeals Chamber's decision requires that rights stem from beneficent
40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (concluded
Dec. 9, 1966), art. 14(1).
41. The thirty-nine year old Du~ko Tadid is a former cafe owner, karate instructor, and
policeman in the town of Kozarac, Bosnia. He is married and has two children. W. H. and
Hillary Kessler, Tadi Trial Primer, AM. LAWYER, Sept., 1995, at 59.
42. Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Prosecutor v. Du§ko Tadid in the Trial Chamber, para. 4.
(Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Trial Chamber].
43. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 72(B).
44. Appeals Chamber, supra note 34, at para. 6.
45. See generally, Appeals Chamber, para. 42.
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grants of legislative and juridical authorities, rather than stemming from a
person's entitlement as a human being. This dangerous precedent calls into
question the nature of protection afforded by all international humanitarian

conventions and treaties.4
For this reason, the Appeals Chamber's
decision warrants a more thorough investigation.
The parties before the Appeals Chamber submitted three potential

interpretations of the phrase established by law. The first interpretation
sounds akin to the Appeals Chamber's conclusion above that rights are
created by law, presumably by a legislative body. The Defense argued that
the legal establishment of a law requires the efforts of a legislature. Under
this interpretation, both executive and judicial acts are not considered law
[Elstablished by law could mean established by a
legislature. [The Defense] claims that the International

Tribunal is the product of a mere executive order and not of
a decision making process under democratic control,
necessary to create a judicial organization in a democratic
society.
Therefore the [Defense] maintains that the

International Tribunal [has] not been establishedby law.47
The European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by both the
European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights, reaches the same conclusion: established by law requires the efforts
of a legislature.48

46. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 3 GAOR, Resolutions
(A/810), at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948): "[Tlhe inherent dignity and... the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world.. . ."; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Preamble, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966): "[R]ights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.";
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Preamble, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 19,
1966): "[R]ights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person."; American Convention
on Human Rights, Preamble, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (adopted Nov. 22, 1969): "Recognizing that the
essential rights of man are not drive from one's being a national of a certain state, but are based
upon attributes of the human personality...."
47. See generally, Appeals Chamber, para. 43.
48. id. para. 43:
The case law applying the word establishedby law ... bears out the view that
the relevant provision is intended to ensure that tribunals in a democratic society
must not depend on the discretion of the executive; rather they should be
regulated by law emanating from Parliament. (See Zand v. Australia, App. No.
7360/76, 15 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 70, 80 (1979); Piersak v.
Belgium, App. No. 8692/79, 476 Eur. H.R. (ser. B) at 12 (1981); Crociani,
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Such a construction, however, undercuts the possibility that law can be
created in a common law fashion. 49 According to this line of thought,
customary law, including customary international law, would cease to be
law. The crimes that the accused war criminals are being tried for, crimes,
which are considered by most scholars as part of customary international
law,50 would cease to be international crimes. Obviously, the Appeals
Chamber did not desire to bring about this counterproductive result.
Because of this danger, the Appeals Chamber refused to interpret the
phrase established by law in this manner. The Appeals Chamber concluded
that because no international legislature exists, which is formally
empowered to enact law binding on international legal subjects, this
interpretation of established by law is not applicable to the international
sphere.5 ' Of course this interpretation begs the question: if no legislative
body can enact binding international law, how could the Security Council
create a Tribunal whose jurisdiction is binding on individual defendants.
A second possible interpretation of established by law refers to the
"establishment of international courts by a body . . . [that] has a limited
power to take [sic] binding decisions." 52 This cryptic phrasing suggests a
court is legally established, if enacted by a political body (such as the
Security Council) that is endowed with the authority to make legally
binding decisions on other branches of an organization.
This second interpretation differs from the first in its not requiring the
actions of a legislature to enact law. Taking a domestic example, the
decisions of the United States' Supreme Court are binding on the coordinate
branches of the United States government; thus these decisions are
considered legally established, even though they are "enacted" without a
legislature.
The Defense argued that because the Security Council decisions are
not necessarily binding on other coordinate branches of the United Nations,
its decisions (such as the establishment of the Tribunal) are not established
by law. 3 The Appeals Chamber responded that the Tribunal should be
considered established by law if the Security Council acted according to its
Palmiotti, Tanassi and D'Ovidio v. Italy, App. Nos. 8603/79, 8722/79, 8723/79
& 8729/79 (joined) 22 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 147, 219 (1981)).
49. By common law fashion, I mean law that is built upon principles of justice and
fairness found in precedential cases, rather than the law that is created by legislative enactment of
statutory law.
50. See generally, Appeals Chamber, para. 98-127.
51. Id.at43.
52. Id.at44.
53. Id.
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powers under the United Nations Charter.54 Thus, if the Security Council
were empowered under the United Nations Charter to make binding
decisions on either the Secretary-General or the General Assembly on

issues falling within its enumerated powers, its creation of the Tribunal
would be, under this second interpretation, "established by law."
Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is empowered
to make legally binding decisions on other organs of the United Nations.55
However, its enumerated powers do not include jurisdiction over

individuals, 6 nor can it create subsidiary organs with broader jurisdiction
that it itself possesses. The Appeals Chamber correctly noted that Security
Council is empowered conditionally to take action when a threat to the
peace is involved.57 However, the scope of the Security Council's authority

to act is the issue at hand, not whether the Security Council can act at all.
The Defense did not question the Security Council's ability to intervene in
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, rather, it maintained that the
Security Council's institution of a criminal tribunal was beyond the scope of

its constitutional powers.
The third possible interpretation of the phrase established by law is
that the establishment of the Tribunal "must be in accordance with the rule
of law." 58 This interpretation refers to the standards and procedural
safeguard common to all legal systems. 5 9 Among these standards are:
"fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full conformity with
internationally recognized human rights instruments. "60

54. Id.:
It does not follow from the fact that the United Nations has no legislature that the Security
Council is not empowered to set up this International Tribunal if it is acting pursuant to an
authority found within its constitution, the United Nations Charter.
55. United Nations Charter, art. 25. Of course, if the establishment of the Tribunal were
binding on other branches, theoretically the General Assembly would have been bound to approve
the Tribunal's funding and thus this would detract from the earlier argument that the General
Assembly's voluntary support was evidence of the consent of its members.
56. The interests of individuals, especially those belonging to minority groups, are not
always well represented by the General Assembly, which is composed of appointed
representatives of nation states rather than elected officials.
57. See generally, Appeals Chamber, para. 29. See also id. para. 44:
"[W]e are of the view that the Security Council was endowed with the power to
create this International Tribunal as a measure under Chapter VII [Article 41] in the
light of its determination that there exists a threat to the peace."
58. Appeals Chamber, supra note 34, at para. 45.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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In addition to finding that the Tribunal satisfied the second
interpretation of established by law, the Appeals Chamber found that the
Tribunal's establishment satisfied this third interpretation. 6' The Security
Council followed the appropriate procedures of the United Nations Charter
in establishing the Tribunal.62 While the third interpretation is obviously
necessary to establishing a legitimate Tribunal, this interpretation does not
bear on the issue of whether the creation of the Tribunal was ultra vires.6 3
The internal procedures of the Tribunal are of secondary importance
compared to whether the existence of the Tribunal is legitimately supported
by international law.
Because the creation of the Tribunal expands the jurisdiction of
international organizations to try and punish individuals, such an expansion
of powers potentially represents a dramatic change in current international
law. 64 That is, even if the Security Council can create a Tribunal, it cannot
enact new international law. Thus, the Tribunal was not legitimately
established by existing international law and is most likely an ultra vires
application of the Security Council's authority. Moreover, the precedent
setting judgments of the Tribunal, which can be said to be creating new
international humanitarian law, is an exercise of jurisdiction beyond the
power of the organ which created the Tribunal, the Security Council.6 5
In summary, Article 14(1) calls for any legitimate international court
to be established by law. The Tribunal was not established by law in the
sense of having been created by a legislative body. As for the second

61. But see Scharf, supra note 21 (criticizing the Tribunal's procedure for allowing
.double jeopardy, rotation between the trial level and appellate level, limiting the defendant's
ability to cross-examine witnesses, and the partial involvement of the Security Council).
62. Appeals Chamber, supra note 34, at para. 47:
"[Tihe Appeals Chamber finds that the International Tribunal has been
established in accordance with the appropriate procedures under the United
Nations Charter and provides all the necessary safeguards of a fair trial. It
is thus 'established by law'."
63. Both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber glossed over this distinction, citing
the fact that a proposed amendment to change the wording of Article 14 to pre-establishedby law
was successfully defeated. Trial Chamber, para. 34; Appeals Chamber, para. 45.
Yet the Defense's concern is not whether or not the Tribunal were pre-established by
law, but rather whether it was created within the legitimate, (if not specifically enumerated),
powers of the Security Council.
64. See R.J. Goldstone, Submissions by the Prosecutor, an Application for Deferral by
the FederalRepublic of Germany in the Matter of Dusko Tadi Also Known by the Names Dusan
'Dule' Tadi at para. 3 (noting that the Tribunal is the first attempt by the United Nations to
enforce international humanitarian law).
65. See infra text accompanying note 80.
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interpretation, although the Tribunal was established by an organ with
binding authority over other branches of the United Nations, the Security
Council's establishment of a tribunal with jurisdiction greater than the
Security Council itself possesses does not satisfy Article 14(1). Although
the Tribunal was established by law according to the third interpretation in
the sense of having fair procedures, this alone is most likely not enough to
satisfy Article 14(1). According to the most critical test of established by
law, i.e., having been established by a body acting within its powers, the
Tribunal was not established by law. Although the Security Council can
bind other organs of the Untied Nations, it cannot bind them with regard to
areas in which it lacks jurisdiction, and jurisdiction over individuals is not
within the Security Council's enumerated or existing powers.
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION
Even if we put aside the question of the legitimacy of the creation of
the Tribunal, the question remains whether this Tribunal has the jurisdiction
to try and punish individuals, even those accused of war crimes. In order
for an international tribunal to legitimately obtain jurisdiction over
individuals, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the tribunal must be
established by law, that is, it must be created in accordance with the current
conceptions and limitations of international law. As discussed above, this
point is debatable. Second, such a tribunal must have jurisdiction to try
individuals.
The question whether a court has jurisdiction over a criminal act may
be divided into two parts: (1) whether the criminal law under which the
criminal act falls authorizes a specific court to try the alleged offense and
(2) whether the court has competence to try the accused for this criminal
act. Taking the United States Supreme Court as an example, the United
States Constitution explicitly grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
over "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be a Party. . . . "66
Because the
Constitution also is the foundation of the Supreme Court's competence, this
same article provides the competence of the Supreme Court to try anyone
accused of these cases. However, the Court's jurisdiction is not unlimited.
For example, the Supreme Court would lack jurisdiction over a dispute
involving a French Ambassador and an Australian consul, that took place in
England, unless there existed some connection to the United States. The

66.

U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. III, cl. 2.
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legislative authority to proscribe conduct does not automatically confer
judicial authority to try all instances of transgression. 67
A.

InternationalCriminalLaw and Competent Courts

On the international scale, the source of an international criminal law
determines which court systems will have legitimate jurisdiction over an
international criminal offense. The two chief sources of international
criminal law are treaty law and international customary law. When an
international criminal law originates in a treaty, we should examine the
treaty to determine the appropriate judicial body to administrate the legal
consequences of violating the law. When the international criminal law
originates in international custom, we should first look to international
custom to determine the appropriate judicial body to administrate the legal

consequences for violating the law.
Many national courts have the jurisdiction to try crimes committed in
violation of international law.68 Judicial bodies that may be empowered to
adjudicate alleged violations of international criminal law include national
or multinational courts. 69 Usually treaties obligate the courts of the
contracting states to try those accused of violating the criminal offenses set
out in the treaty.70

67. See Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192, 103 Eng. Rep. 546 (K.B. 1908)(A default
judgment case, in which Lord Ellenborough inquired: "Can the Isle of Tobago pass a law to bind
the rights of the whole world? Would the world submit to such an assumed jurisdiction?").
68. See German Grundgesetz (Basic Law), art. 25 which incorporates rules of customary
international law as part of German federal law. See also similar provisions incorporating
customary international law as part of national law, and thus within the jurisdiction of national
courts: art. 9 of the Austrian Constitution, art. 2 of the Greek Constitution, and art. 10 of the
Italian Constitution.
For incorporation of treaty provisions into national law see the Netherlands
Constitution, arts. 91(3), 94 (1983); art. 55 of French Constitution as decided by the Klaus Barbie
Case (Cour de Cassation, 62 J.C.P. II, No. 20,107 (Criminal Chamber) (October 6, 1983)
reprintedin 78 I.L.R. 125, 128-31(1988).
69. Prior to the creation of the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, there have only been a multinational war crimes tribunals. See Trial Chamber, para.
6: "This is the first time that the international community has created a court with criminal
jurisdiction."
"The Nuremberg Tribunals--the closest analogy--was not in fact a body
representing the international community as a whole, but was created by a special treaty of the
victorious nations after World War II." Lieutenant Col. Robert T. Mounts, USAF (Retired),
Douglass W. Cassel, Jr. & Jeffrey L. Bleich, Panel II: War Crimes and Other Human Rights
Abuses in the Former Yugoslavia, 16 WHITrTER L. REV. 387, 412 n.44 (1995).
70. Theodor Meron, InternationalCriminalizationof InternalAtrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 554, 561 (1995).
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The United Nations Secretary-General recently reaffirmed the
criminality of numerous provisions of international humanitarian law. The
Secretary-General also stated that violators of these international laws will
be held individually responsible. "The Security Council has reaffirmed on
several occasions that persons who commit or order the commission of
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia are individually responsible for such breaches as serious
violations of international humanitarian law." 7 However, regardless of the
illegality of these actions, this illegality alone does not confer universally
the jurisdiction to try those accused of these violations of international
humanitarian law.72 None of the provisions of treaties defining war crimes
authorizes the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia to try alleged violations of these international crimes.
B.

Does the Tribunal have Legitimate Jurisdictionover Individuals?

The question whether the Tribunal has legitimate jurisdiction over
individuals accompanies the question relating to the establishment of the
Tribunal.73 Even if the Tribunal was established by law, as required by
Article 14(1), 7 4 the scope of the Tribunal's jurisdiction would still be an
issue. For this reason, this section investigates the sources and limits of the
Tribunal's jurisdiction.
1. Sources of the Tribunal's Jurisdiction
The sources of Tribunal's jurisdiction differ from those of past war
crimes tribunals the most famous of which is the Niirnberg Tribunal. The
Niirnberg Tribunal perceived two grounds for its jurisdiction. First, under
customary international law, a victor's assumption of jurisdiction, after an
unconditional surrender of a defeated state, legitimately transfers the
territorial jurisdiction normally exercised by the courts of the defeated state.
Thus the unconditional surrender of the German Reich to the Allied
Powers, endowed them with legitimate jurisdiction to try and punish
individuals for war crimes as defined by German law. 75

71. Report of the Secretary-General,para. 39, 53.
72. Obviously a court or tribunal set up illegally, would not have the jurisdiction to try
these offenses.
73. See supra text accompanying note 40.
74. Id.
75. This territorial jurisdiction is distinguishable from victor's justice jurisdiction, which
the Nidrnberg Tribunal explicitly rejected: the Allied Power's jurisdiction to try and punish those
aacused of war crimes and crimes against humanity was "not an arbitrary exercise of power on
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Second, the Allied Powers, in creating a war crimes tribunal to try
those accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity and punish those
found responsible, did "together what any one of them might have done
singly. " 76 Because the crimes of which the accused were charged were
crimes associated with universal jurisdiction, any of the Allied Powers
could have tried the accused in their own national courts, regardless of the

situs of the offense or the nationalities of the offenders or the victims.
[The universality principle assumes that every state has an
interest in exercising jurisdiction to combat egregious
offenses that states universally have condemned. Piracy
and slave trading are the prototypical offenses that any state
can define and punish because pirates and slave traders
77
have long been considered the enemies of all humanity.

Although the Nirnberg Tribunal stands as an example of an organization of
states trying individuals for war crimes, the question remains whether an
organization having no direct connection to the hostilities may apply

universal jurisdiction in excess of its express jurisdictional limits.
The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia does not rest on either of the grounds that supported the
Nimberg Tribunal.
First, no clear victor in the conflict can be

determined.78 While victor's justice has been highly criticized, few victors
have ever been tried for their war crimes.

Second, the accused are being

the part of the victorious Nations." InternationalMilitary Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and
Sentences (Oct. 1, 1946), reprintedin 41 AM. J.INT'L L. 172, 216 (1947).
76. Id. at 216.
77. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L.
REV. 785, 788 (1995). See Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
pirates as hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind).
78. "[H]ow do you convene a war-crimes trial when the accused have won the war--or
have not been defeated and run to ground?", No Road to Nuremberg from Dayton, CHI. TRIB.
Nov. 12, 1995, at 12, WL 6267217 (comparing the Tribunal to that of the Niirnberg trials).
79. Although the fire bombing of Dresden, the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, and the atrocities committed in Vietnam come readily to mind, no soldier or
commander has been brought to justice for these intentional losses to civilian life. See National
Public Radio, Four Hours in My La: Book About the Massacre, Weekend Edition, (March 14,
1992):
.400 Vietnamese civilians--unarmed old men, women and young
children--were murdered by US soldiers .... who destroyed the hamlet of My
Lai. Only four participants were ever brought to trial and only one, Lieutenant
William Calley, who received a life sentence, ever served time for the killings.
Mr. Calley spent several months under house arrest before being paroled.
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tried by non-participants in the conflict.

If the Tribunal's jurisdictional

grounds are not those of the Niirnberg Tribunal's, where, then, can they be

found?
The Security Council functions as the limited executive branch of the

United Nations, possessing neither legislative nor judicial functions. Thus,
the Security Council can neither create new international law nor make
binding interpretations of existing international law.
It should be pointed out that, in assigning to the
International Tribunal the task of prosecuting persons

responsible

for

serious

violations

of

international

humanitarian law, the Security Council would not be

creating or purporting to legislate that law.

Rather, the

International Tribunal would have the task of applying
existing international humanitarian law.80
For this reason, in his report the Secretary-General stated that the
international law applied must be "beyond any doubt part of customary
[international] law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all
States to specific conventions does not arise.""' It would be absurd for the
Secretary-General to require that the substantive law (i.e. what actions
constitute war crimes) applied by the Tribunal be part of established
customary international law, while allowing the procedural law (i.e. the
scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal) applied by the Tribunal to exceed
existing customary international law.
It is problematic that United Nations Charter does not contain a
provision giving any branch of the United Nations jurisdiction or authority
to try or punish individuals. 2 The United Nations does not have the
authority to try or imprison individuals, even those who have violated
international law. Moreover, the Security Council's ability to punish
80. Secretary-General'sReport, para. 29.
81.
Secretary-General's Report, para. 33. Interestingly, such a construction of the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal assumes that a state's consent is necessary to
legitimizing the process of the court.
82. Although the elimination of discrimination based upon race, sex, language and
religion are listed as purposes of the United Nations, (United Nations Charter, arts. 1(3) and
55(c)), the framers of the Charter contemplated that the promotion and protection of these
purposes would be by member-states rather than by the intervention of the United Nations (arts.
2(2) and 2(7)). Of course, the final sentence of Article 2(7) concludes that this article will not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII, the very chapter used by
the Security Council to create the Tribunal. However, it is unlikely that Chapter VII was
envisaged as providing near limitless power upon this highly unrepresentative organ.

19981

Koran

individuals for international crimes is not among its enumerated powers
listed in the United Nations Charter.
In addition, no international
convention, agreement or treaty that codifies international humanitarian law
grants to the United Nations the power to adjudicate these criminal cases. 83
Instead, these documents generally state that the signatory states will have
the jurisdiction
to try these cases, often regardless of where the violation
84
occurs.

2. Limits of the Tribunal's Jurisdiction
Undeniably, the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited by the Security
Council's jurisdictional limitations. 85 No political body can delegate more
jurisdiction than it itself possesses. Thus, the Tribunal's jurisdiction cannot
exceed that of the Security Council's. The Trial Chamber noted this fact

83. For instance, the pertinent articles of The Convention of the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, provide an example of the understanding that national
tribunals are the appropriate tribunals to try those accused of the odious crime of genocide:
Article V: The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with
the respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the
provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective
penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated
in article III.
Article VI: Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in
the territory of which the act was committed, or by such internationalpenal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties
which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
G.A. Res. 260(HI) A (Dec. 9, 1948) (emphasis added). It was generally accepted that an
international criminal tribunal could not be created without first obtaining consent from
contracting parties to confer jurisdiction on the tribunal. Report of the 1953 Committee on
InternationalCriminalJurisdiction, General Assembly, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12 (A/2645) at para.
50 (1954) cited in BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ,

AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STEP

TOWARD WORLD PEACE--A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 439 (1980).
84. See for example article IV of The International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) (obligating parties to adopt legislation to try offenders of this
law regardless where the crime occurs). But cf. articles 5 and 8 of The Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Annex to G.A. Res.
3946 (Dec. 17, 1984) (limiting a state's national jurisdiction over crime of torture and other
degrading treatment to territorial jurisdiction (when the offense occurred in the prosecuting state's
territory), nationality jurisdiction (when the alleged offender is a national of the prosecuting state),
and passive personality jurisdiction (when the victim is a national of the prosecuting state)).
85. See generally, Appeals Chamber, para. 28.
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when answering the Defenses' contention that the Tribunal was an ultra
vires action of the Security Council.
Support for the view that the Security Council cannot act
arbitrarily... is found in the nature of the Charter as a treaty
delegating certain powers to the Untied Nations. In fact, such a
limitation is almost a corollary of the principle that the organs of
the Untied Nations must act in accordance with the powers
delegated them.8 6
Moreover, because the Tribunal is not empowered to create new
international law, the Tribunal is limited by the historical limits of the
jurisdiction of the Security Council. The Appeals Chamber conceded that:
the Security Council is an organ of an international
organization, established by a treaty which serves as a
constitutional framework for that organization. ...
Those
powers cannot, in any case, go beyond the limits of the
jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to mention
other specific limitations or those which may derive from
the internal division of power within the Organization. 7
The limitations on the Security Council's authority are stated in Chapters
VI, VII, VIII, and XII of the United Nations' Charter. 8
The most
important of these chapters is Chapter VII, "Action with Respect to Threats
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Under
Chapter VII, the Security Council is authorized to interrupt economic
relations,8 9 halt transnational communication, 9° cease diplomatic relations,91
86. See generally, Trial Chamber, para. 15.
87. Appeals Chamber, para. 28.
88. U.N. Charter, art. 24(2): "The specific powers appointed to the Security Council for
the discharge of these duties are laid down in chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII." It is important to
note that some scholars maintain that these specific powers are not limitations, but examples of
powers. According to this argument the Security Council has power limited only by the general
purposes of the United Nations (Chapter 1). However, it seems unlikely that the drafters of the
document would have enabled the least representative branch of the United Nations with such
unchecked control. Furthermore, it is unlikely that if such power existed, it would have gone
unused as it has--nearly 50 years. This is even more unlikely when taking into account the
Security Council's silence in the face of the atrocities committed in Cambodia, under the Pol Pot
regime. See also Trial Chamber, para. 7.
89. U.N. Charter art. 41.
90. U.N. Charter art. 41.
91.
U.N. Charter art. 41.
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enforce economic sanctions,9 2 and initiate armed invasion.93 None of these
provisional measures taken by the Security Council may prejudice "the
rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. "94
None of these explicit powers grants the Security Council jurisdiction
over individuals, nor does any other provision of the United Nations
Charter, nor has the Security Council ever asserted such powers in the past.
For these reasons, we may conclude that, historically, the Security Council
has not had jurisdiction over individuals.
Despite the United Nations' lack of authority to try individuals,
national courts are often empowered to apply international law in their
domestic role.95 For instance, both the Constitution and the Criminal Code
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1990, incorporate both
international customary and treaty law into national law. 96 Thus, it would
be a completely legitimate exercise of jurisdiction for a national court
established by the newly independent states of the former Yugoslavia to try
individuals accused of violating international law. Because the existence of
alternate forums in which to try those accused of violating international
humanitarian law, there is little need to bend out of shape the rules of
existing international law to cover the creation of an international tribunal.
The prosecution for the Tribunal has argued that it is odd that the
community of nations could each try a violator of international
humanitarian law individually, but not collectively under the auspices of the
United Nations. 97 However, odd it may be, this is the current state of
international law.
92. U.N. Charter art. 42.
93. U.N. Charter art. 42.
94. U.N. Charter art. 40. The cryptic phrasing of Article 40 leaves unexplained how the
Security Council may launch an armed invasion into a State without prejudice to its rights or
claims.
95. Appeals Chamber, 32 I.L.J. 1993, para. 132.
96. Id.; See also Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, art. 210.
97. See Appeals Chamber, para. 135. Compare this argument to the justification of the
Nurnberg Tribunal, see supra text accompanying note 75. The jurisdictional powers of the
Nurnberg Tribunal and the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia may be
distinguished by the foundations upon which the tribunals' jurisdiction rests. The jurisdiction of
the Nirnberg Tribunal rested upon three foundations of its jurisdiction: territorial jurisdiction of
the German Reich, the customary international law of victors' justice having secured Germany's
unconditional surrender and the universal jurisdiction to try those accused of violating
international humanitarian law. In contrast, the jurisdiction of the International War Crimes
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia rests solely upon this final foundation: universal jurisdiction
to try those accused of violating international humanitarian law. Moreover, the International War
Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's jurisdiction over individuals is highly questionable.
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IV. THE TRIBUNAL'S ABILITY TO QUESTION ITS JURISDICTION
Given the arguments of the proceeding sections, the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal over individuals is highly questionable.
However, without
standing to question the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or an appropriate forum
in which to question the Tribunal's jurisdiction the preceding sections
would be doomed to realm of academic musings. Part III argues that even
though the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to try and punish
individuals, it does have the jurisdiction to decide the legal scope of its
jurisdiction.
The word jurisdiction in regard to a judicial body is capable of several
meanings. 98 The first interpretation is the power to decide whether one has
the authority to decide the matter before the court. A court's ability to
decide its own jurisdiction fits within this interpretation. The second
interpretation is the power to decide the matter under the law. A court's
abilities to adjudicate a dispute and to decide a criminal action are examples
of this second interpretation. The third interpretation, often referred to as
subject-matterjurisdiction, is the power to decide what law applies to the
matter before the court. A court's ability to rule on which laws govern a
given situation illustrates this third interpretation. While the first two parts
of this paper addressed the Tribunal's jurisdictional power over individuals,
the second interpretation of jurisdiction, Part III examines the first
interpretation of jurisdiction. Part III addresses whether the Tribunal can
98.

Jurisdiction is capable of several meanings, each dealing with the relation of authority

of different branches of a political organization and law. Legislativejurisdiction is the authority
to create law applicable to specific actors, events or things. Adjudicatory jurisdiction is the
authority to subject actors or things to the processes of judicial or administrative tribunals.

Enforcement jurisdiction is the authority to compel specific actors to comply with its laws and to
redress noncompliance. Kenneth C. Randall, UniversalJurisdiction Under InternationalLaw, 66
TEX. L. REv. 785, 786 (1988).
In regards to legislative jurisdiction, five types of criminal jurisdiction exist. See
Eric S. Kobrick, The Ex Post Facto Prohibitionand the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction Over
InternationalCrimes, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1519 (1987):
International law recognizes five types of criminal jurisdiction: (1) territorial --

jurisdiction based on the location where the alleged crime was committed, and
including objective territorial jurisdiction, which allows countries to reach acts
committed outside territorial limits but intended to produce, and producing,
detrimental effects within a nation; (2) nationality -- jurisdiction based on the

nationality of the offender; (3) protective -- jurisdiction based on the protection
of the interests and the integrity of the nation; (4) passive personality -jurisdiction

based on the nationality of the victim; and (5) universality

--

jurisdiction for certain crimes where custody of the offender is sufficient.
See also Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under InternationalLaw, 66 TEx. L.

REV. 785, 787-88 (1988).
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rule on its own jurisdiction, or whether such an investigation would either
be barred by the limits of the Tribunal's judicial review powers or be
barred as a non-justiciable political question.
A. The Tribunal'sAbility to Decide Whether it Can Question its Own
Jurisdiction
The first defendant to be brought before the Tribunal is Dugko Tadi6.
In accordance with Rule 73(A)(I), 99 Tadi 's defense questioned the
legitimacy of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, presenting the Tribunal with the
first opportunity to examine this controversial issue. The Trial Chamber
held that the Tribunal was not empowered to question the legitimacy of its
creation. I°° The Trial Chamber declined to entertain the question of its own
jurisdiction for several reasons.
[I]t is not for this Trial Chamber to judge the
reasonableness of the acts of the Security Council .... 1o1
[E]ven if there be such limits [on the powers of the Security
Council], that is not to say that any judicial body, let alone
this International Tribunal, can exercise powers of judicial
review to determine
whether . . . those limits have been
02
exceeded.
The Trial Chamber considered such challenges to its jurisdiction and
the question of the legitimacy of the Security Council's action in creating
the Tribunal as being non-justiciable, because either the Tribunal lacked the
power of judicial review or that questioning the actions of the Security
Council (including the establishment of the Tribunal) involved a political
question.
With regard to lacking power of judicial review, the Trial Chamber
found persuasive precedent in the rulings of the International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.) and the Administrative Tribunal that these courts lacked
judicial review powers over the decisions of other organs of the United
Nations. In the Namibia Advisory Opinion, the I.C.J. held that "the Court

99. Rules of Evidence and Procedure, Rule 75 (A) (I).
100. See generally, Trial Chamber, para. 8.
101.

Id. at para. 16.

102. Id. at para. 17.
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does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the
03
decisions taken by the United Nations organ concerned."
With regard to the Security Council's actions being a political
question, and therefore non-justiciable, the Tribunal concluded:
"The
factual and political nature of an Article 39 determination by the Security
Council makes it inherently inappropriate for any review by this Trial
Chamber. "'0 4 Note that the Trial Chamber strictly interpreted its own
jurisdiction as described in Article 1 of its Statute as being precisely and
narrowly defined, stating the "full extent of the competence of the
International Tribunal."' 05 Contrariwise, the Trial Chamber rendered a
liberal interpretation of the Security Council's jurisdiction, reading the
enumerated economic and political measures accorded placed under
Security Council jurisdiction by Article 41 as not exhaustive.' °6
The Defense appealed the ruling of the Trial Chamber to the Appeals
Chamber. The Appeals Chamber rephrased this Prosecutor's arguments
against the Tribunal's ability to question the legitimacy of its creation:
This position comprises two arguments: one relating to the
power of the International Tribunal to consider such a plea;
and another relating to the classification of the subjectmatter of the plea as a 'political question' and, as such,
'non-justiciable', regardless of whether or not it falls within
its jurisdiction.'0 7
Although the International Tribunal was not established to "scrutinize the
actions of organs of the United Nations,"' 0 8 the Appeals Chamber found it
had jurisdiction to examine the legitimacy of its jurisdiction as established
by the Security Council."' 9 The Appeals Chamber found the power to
decide its own jurisdiction in the residual power of its judicial function.
"[J]urisdiction cannot be determined exclusively by reference to or
inference from the intention of the Security Council thus totally ignoring
any residual powers which may deserve from the requirements of the
'judicial function' itself. " 110
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at para. 11.
Id. at para. 24.
See generally, Trial Chamber, para. 8.
Id. at para. 28.
32 I.C.J. 1993, para. 13.
Id. at para. 20.
Id. at para. 21.
Id. at para. 14.
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In deciding this issue, the Appeals Chamber distinguished two types of
adjudicatory jurisdiction, each referred to by more than one name:
original, primary or substantive jurisdiction refers to the jurisdiction
explicitly conferred by statute;"' incidentalor inherent jurisdiction refers 1to2
the jurisdiction that derives from the exercise of the judicial function. 1
Among the inherent jurisdictional powers of a court is KompetenzKompetenz in German or la competence de la compitence
in French, i.e.
3
the power of a court to determine its own jurisdiction."
The Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber's decision on its
ability to investigate the legitimacy of its creation, holding that the Tribunal
did have the authority to interpret the Charter of the United Nations and
thus investigate the legitimacy of the Security Council's actions in creating
the Tribunal.
The Appeals Chamber does not consider that the
International Tribunal is barred from examination of the
Defense's jurisdictional plea by the so-called114 'political' or
'non-justiciable' nature of the issues it raises.
[I]t has been argued that the question put to the Court is
intertwined with political questions, and that for this reason
the Court should refuse to give an opinion. It is true that
most interpretations of the Charter of the United Nations
will have political significance, great or small. In the
nature of things it could not be otherwise. The Court,
however, cannot attribute political character to a request
which invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task,
namely, the interpretation of a treaty provision. 15
According to this ruling, the Tribunal may investigate the legitimacy
of its creation by the Security Council. This important decision allows the
Tribunal to rectify the situation in which it now finds itself, namely, that
despite the best of intentions, the legitimacy of the establishment of the
Tribunal is in peril.

111. Id. at para. 20.
112. Id.
113. 32 I.C.J. 1993, para. 18.
114. Id. at 25.
115. Appeals Chamber, para. 24 quoting Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962
I.C.J. Reports 151, at 155 (Advisory Opinion of July 20, 1962).
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B. Establishinga Legitimate InternationalCriminal Court, With
JurisdictionOver War Crimes
Two courses of action could be taken to institute a International
Criminal Court, whose legitimacy would be beyond question. First, the
General Assembly could act. The General Assembly is the only branch of
the United Nations capable of amending its Charter or expanding the
powers vested in the Organization. l" 6 Although Article 10 grants the power
to amend the Charter to the General Assembly, this article also incorporates
Article 12, which limits the General Assembly's ability to interfere in any
action of the Security Council, other than by the. Security Council's
request. 11 7 The limits imposed by Article 12 are themselves limited to only
those functions of the Security Council "assigned to [the Security Council]
in the present Charter."' 18
Thus the question arises, if the Security Council is exercising powers
beyond those assigned by the Charter, is the General Assembly limited by
Article 12? It seems unlikely that this question will reach the International
Court of Justice, for unless there is overwhelming pressure to have the
Statute of the Tribunal ratified as a treaty, the General Assembly will not
press the matter.
However, if broad support for ratification where to
arise, the Security Council would be unlikely to impede the ratification of
the Statute of the Tribunal as a treaty. Thus, there being no procedural
obstacles, the General Assembly should proceed to ratify the statute as a
treaty in order to demonstrate overwhelming support for the Tribunal, or by
its inaction the General Assembly could acknowledge that the Security
Council has the ability to create new international law. Ratification, which
would greatly enhance the Tribunal's legitimacy, would also provide a
viable precedent for the eventual establishment of a international criminal
court.
V. CONCLUSION

In Part I we saw that the legitimacy of the creation of the Tribunal is
highly questionable.
First, the Tribunal was not established by a
representative body of the international community. Second, the manner in
which the Tribunal was established neither affords the international
community of States the opportunity to consent to the establishment of the
Tribunal nor enables them to object to its establishment. Third, the

116. U.N. Charter, art. 10.
117. See id., at art 12.
118. U.N. Charter, art. 12.
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Tribunal was hastily established. The resultant mistakes from this haste
detract from the legitimacy of the Tribunal.
In Part II we saw that Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to that of the
Security Council's. First, nowhere in the United Nations Charter is the
Security Council granted jurisdiction over individuals. Second, historically
the Security Council has not had jurisdiction over individuals. Third, the
Security Council is not empowered to create new international law. For
these reasons, the Security Council cannot create a Tribunal with legitimate
jurisdiction over individuals.
In Part III we examined the Tribunal's ability to question its own
jurisdiction. Because all courts have Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the Tribunal
does have the power to investigate the limits of its jurisdiction. The
Appeals Chamber concluded that it was not barred from examining its own
creation by the Security Council nor was the legitimacy of its creation a
non-justiciable political question. Accordingly, based on the reasoning of
Parts I and II, the Appeals Chamber should have concluded that it had no
jurisdiction over individuals, even those accused of violating international
humanitarian law.
The Appeals Chamber overcome with the immensity of the atrocities
and its desire to prevent their continuance, glossed over the technical
requirements of jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
[T]o the violations at issue here, we have no doubt that they
entail individual criminal responsibility, regardless of
whether they are committed in internal or international
armed conflicts. . . . No one can doubt the gravity of the
acts at issue, nor the interest of the international community
in their prohibition.11 9
Such conclusive language without the support of reasoned legal analysis
fails to endow the Tribunal with unassailable legitimacy.' 20
119. Appeals Chamber, 32 I.C.J. 1993, para. 129.
120. On November 21, 1995, the leaders of the former Yugoslavian republics signed a
peace agreement in Dayton. The peace agreement carefully avoids using the word consent in
reference to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. For the sake of consistency, those who believe that
the Tribunal was established within the legitimate powers of the Security Council, the consent of
the governments whose citizens are on trial is irrelevant. Thus, the Dayton peace agreement
states that the governments must "cooperate with. . . the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia." Proximity Peace Agreement at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio
(November 1- 21, 1995), Chapter 3, art. XIII(4).
Note that by cooperating with the Tribunal, the government have only agreed to
cooperate with its adjudicatory jurisdiction, i.e., the findings and holdings of the Tribunal. The
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The creation of an international criminal court is very appealing and a
most worthy endeavor to pursue. The Trial Chamber has suggested that the
Tribunal "represents an important step towards the establishment of a
permanent international criminal tribunal." 12 ' To provide posterity with
the precedent of a legitimate international criminal tribunal, the creation of
the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia should be
thoroughly scrutinized.
An international criminal court should be
established, but established by the most representative body of States in
order to ensure that all States have a voice in the creation of a court that
can try and punish their citizens. This paper addressed problems in the
creation and jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia. This Tribunal was not created in complete conformity
with the rules and limitations of existing international law. It is my hope
that bringing these problems into clearer focus, will enable the world
community to overcome the legal hurdles obstructing the establishment of a
fully legitimate international criminal court.

enforcement jurisdiction of whatever body may be charged with "arresting" alleged war criminals
is not mentioned in the peace agreement. However, the final words of article XIII(4) add that the
governments will cooperate with "any other organization authorized by the U.N..Security Council
with a mandate concerning human rights or humanitarian law." Presumably the governments
have committed to the implicit understanding that they will cooperate with other organizations
legitimately authorized (i.e., within its powers) by the Security Council.
121. See generally, Trial Chamber, para. 6.

